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Environmental services on agricultural land
Agriculture is the basis for livelihood activities of 40% of the
world’s population and occupies 40% of total land area; 90%
of the farms worldwide have a size of less than two hectares
(IAASTD 2008, p.2). Smallholder farming can therefore
critically affect the global ecosystem. With environmental
integrity prominent on the global political agenda, the world
community is looking for a form of agriculture that supports
biodiversity and other environmental services (FAO 2008;
Scherr et al, 2009; UN 2009). Payment for Environmental
Services (PES) is often mentioned as a major innovation in
this regard (Diaz et al 2005; FAO 2008; UN 2009).
In the current PES debate, the focus is not centrally on
agriculture itself: farmers are instead involved in delivering
off-farm services in forests, re-greening degraded land,
maintaining trees along rivers, and so forth. This paper
focuses on the possibility of PES mechanisms to support
family farms in the South in changing their agricultural
practices on arable land, where the core of farming activity
takes place. 
Background to the Gafsa Oasis
Gafsa Oasis, Tunisia is a well documented pilot for the Food
and Agricultural Organisation’s (FAO) Globally Important
Agricultural Heritage Systems (GIAHS) programme (FAO 2009).
Gafsa is situated in the mid-west of the country on the
northern fringe of the Sahara desert, with an estimated
250mm of annual rainfall. In Gafsa, mountains collect
rainwater forming an oasis in the downstream valley; originally
the oasis was 700 hectares, but with water pumping the area
has increased by fivefold. It is one of a few oases in the area
where the landscape is dominated by rocky mountains, sandy
dunes, and savannah crossed by seasonal rivers. 
This paper presents a single case of an extensive study amid
a package of activities to preserve the oasis, involving local
farmer organisations, NGOs, the local Government and
business community. Local authorities and NGOs assume that
farmers have forgotten traditional methods and need training
and awareness-raising to motivate farm workers to restore
these practices. We interviewed key informants and farmers,
participated in workshops with local NGOs and walked across
the oasis, where we found that in some places the traditional
three-layer cropping system was intact, and in others the
diverse system was destroyed and the land polluted or
encroached with (illegal) building. Out of the multitude of
stories and cases we came across, we highlight two families
working on rather contrasting sites to unveil mechanisms by
which farmers do or do not deliver environmental services. 
A “multi-cropping” farming family
The farmers to the left of Figure 1 (A) derive their practices
from traditional methods with three layers of production:
palm trees in a 50-100 years’ cycle; fruit trees in a 5-15
years’ cycle, and annual crops. The combined cropping layers
under the closed canopy make optimum use of water and
land, and the production method is labour-intensive:
individual plants need nurturing in niches where they fit
best, and annual crops are planted in between fruit trees.
Tree management is also specialised: different fruits require
complicated fertilisation methods. The family consumes part
of their produce, but mostly they sell fruits and vegetables
on the local market. These “traditional” farmers were
immigrants into the oasis. They have leased this land for
twenty years from a local family whose children left the farm
to live and work in the cities. 
A “mono-cropping” farming family
The farmer to the right of Figure 1 (B) employs a different
strategy. The family has been staying on this particular plot
for a few months only, taking the place of other families
who  each stayed for less than a year to take care of the
house of the landowner, who left the oasis for the capital.
It uses water allowances to grow annual crops such as
salads for the local market. In order to create space, the
farmer removed fruit trees. This immigrant family has few
lease rights: the landowner avoids long-term tenure as
after some years, tenants would be in a position to legally
claim tenure rights. Formally, the minimum lease period is
three years, but the authorities do not enforce this rule.
Hence the tenants’ position: “We have no interest in
maintaining trees: they are not productive in the short
term. In order to get rewards for guarding the land, we
must grow annual crops.” The tenure practice motivates
this farmer to grow crops that pay fast, and to destroy
palm and fruit trees and agro-biodiversity. 
Delivering environmental services from agricultural land
The comparison provides a few useful insights:
Farming can deliver a variety of environmental services. Even
though they are immigrants, the multi-cropping family
employs local agricultural traditions, dynamically conserving
local knowledge of ecology. These practices stabilise the soil,
make judicious use of water, and bind carbon. Multi-layer
cropping systems are likely to create resiliency to climate
change, because a mixture of crops spreads risks and reduces
transpiration of scarce water. Similarly, the traditional
system provides biodiversity (different crops in different
layers, habitat for non-agricultural flora and fauna),
including agro-biodiversity (some crops were traditional,
others improved stocks). It also provides landscape beauty
and shade to town inhabitants.
Securing long-term production is the main driver for a system
that provides environmental services. The multi-cropping
farming family delivers these services as part of an optimum
production system, not as a response to any ideological or
external stimulus (see also Van der Ploeg 2008).
2. Market-friction reduction: eco-labels
With market-friction reduction you “brand” a product for
particular (environmental, cultural, health) qualities so that
consumers buy both a product and sustainable production
methods. Such mechanisms exist widely for organic and fair
trade products. Buyers of environmental services are
consumers; governors of such systems are NGOs that set and
regulate standards (Ruben 2008). This traditional production
system could be branded. Someone would need to set and
monitor criteria, and make them known to farmers and
consumers. Considerable investments would be required to
realise such a system. Alternatively, oasis farmers could try
to become part of the organic or fair trade labelling systems.
In the Gafsa setting, both farmers could benefit from such a
scheme. For tenants with long-term land rights it would
however be easier to build a long-term relationship with the
governor of the system or traders. We can conclude that
linking environmental services to existing (fair trade,
organic) labels is a possible means of supporting long-term
tenants.
3. Rewards and compensations: tax mechanisms and
tradable permits
Further financial rewards and compensations are tax
mechanisms (e.g. tax holidays for not polluting or
conservation) and tradable permits, of which the working
principle is that “the polluter pays”. These demand a strong
monitoring system that collects data to impose or reduce
taxes accordingly, for example, assessing the number of trees
through aerial photography. Yet, even if there were a strong
governing actor, tax and permit mechanisms are likely to be
directed towards legal landowners, and not to informal
tenants. As we found that landowners can violate the rules
with regards to tenant arrangements, it would take quite
drastic institutional development to organise tax mechanisms
sufficient to stimulate provision of environmental services.
The tenant decides on day-to-day decisions; the landowner sets
the tenure arrangements. In the above examples, it appears
that formal landowners have a marginal say about direct
interventions in the agricultural system. Both families are
immigrants. The family with the long-term lease contract
replicates traditional farming methods that provide sustainable
environmental services. The family with a short-term contract
is in no position to invest in different crop layers. Hence, the
tenants decide on the farming system and determine delivery
of environmental services (Wunder 2005), whilst landowners
provide the wider conditions in which tenants can optimise
economic and ecological benefits – or not.
Regulation has marginal impact if not enforced. Short-term
tenure is forbidden by law; yet, this rule is not enforced –
with disastrous results to agricultural ecosystems.
Considering the impact of direct monetary incentives
With a theoretical experiment, we can evaluate how the two
farming families might respond to different monetary
incentives. 
1. Direct payments and subsidies 
An example of the “direct payment” mechanism is the
process of paying farmers for the planting or maintenance of
trees. The oasis is a place for recreation for citizens and
tourists, so Gafsa town could make funds available to directly
pay farmers to maintain the oasis landscape. However,
neither family owns the farmland nor do they have formal
land titles. Subsidies are likely to reach the formal
landowners and redirection of these funds would depend on
voluntary arrangements between landowners and tenants.
Commanding and monitoring such arrangements and the
effects on the number of trees would be difficult. It is
conceivable that, in order to obtain subsidies, the landowner
would review the arrangements with tenants to maintain
cropping layers, even if it could mean losing some control
over tenure rights. 
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Figure 1. Two oasis farmer families with distinct practices. The (A) family employs a mixed cropping system. The (B) family grows annual crops only. The first family has a long, the
other a short lease arrangement. Photos: Frank van Schoubroeck.
A B
19[ Mountain Forum Bulletin January 2010 ]
Feature
Conclusion and discussion
From an environmental point of view, PES can stimulate and
institutionalise sustainable environmental practices in farming
systems. However, the key person to realise environmental
services is the actual farm worker, whether s/he is the formal
land owner, a long-term or a short-term tenant. Thus, for an
effective PES mechanism, one needs to develop a plausible
relationship between the payments and the farmers who
deliver environmental services on the ground.
For a decision-maker in the Gafsa Oasis, it is questionable if
setting up PES mechanisms would be the best investment in
realising environmental services. As we have seen, at present
farmers realise such services as a side-product of production,
provided that they are in a position to build up the farming
system from within a long-term perspective. This observation
is in line with the theory of Van der Ploeg (2008) who explains
that it makes economic sense for peasant farmers to invest
in a rich ecology and a growing flow of germplasm, nutrients
and water on their farm and therefore produce a variety of
environmental services. Possibly, the best way to invest in
these services is therefore to create conditions by which
farmers can optimise their farming system, starting with
securing long-term tenure rights.
PES-like mechanisms might further support farmers to deliver
environmental services if they take into account the
individual positions of farmers. Payments or tax reduction
may support farmers, but are more likely to be effective if
they streamline the relationship between tenants and
landowners. The same counts for labelling mechanisms. In
fact, a close study of different types of relations between
farmers, tenants and land owners is necessary for any
monetary incentive to have the desired effect. This is in line
with Wunder (2005) who states that not the de jure land
rights but the de facto control capacity is decisive for a PES
scheme. In a closed oasis, targeting tenants with long term
land rights will provide more ready benefits than tenants
with shorter term arrangements. 
The necessary institutional arrangements are more likely to
be present in the North than in the global South, which
explains why few farmer organisations in the South support
the idea of PES for securing environmental integrity (Haddad
2009). It may therefore be a more effective investment to
look into the reasons why farmers produce environmental
services, and consider payments as one of the many options
– besides the realisation of rights (to land, to water, to
markets, etc.) or capacity building. The presence of a PES
scheme is often a catalyst to achieve other benefits such as
the strengthening of property rights, because farmers
become visible on the local political agenda (Grieg-Gran et
al. 2008). Buyers of environmental services can then support
the realisation of such rights. 
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